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
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DIST 21 JULY 1972

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

DOI 8 APRIL - 7 JULY 1972

SUBJECT RESULTS OF THE NATIONAL POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH ROLL-UP  
CAMPAIGN IN GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MILITARY REGION 3  
DURING THE PERIOD 8 APRIL - 7 JULY 1972

ACQ VIETNAM, BIEN HOA (17 JULY 1972) FIELD NO. [REDACTED]

PARAGRAPHS 1, 4 AND 5 FROM

GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) REGIONAL POLICE OFFICIALS  
IN CHARGE OF THE MILITARY REGION (MR) 3 SPECIAL  
CAMPAIGN, WHO WERE AWARE THEIR REMARKS WOULD REACH  
UNITED STATES OFFICIALS; PARAGRAPHS 2 AND 3 FROM  
OFFICIAL GVN MR 3 POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH REPORTS  
TO NATIONAL POLICE HEADQUARTERS, NOT OTHERWISE  
AVAILABLE.

SUMMARY. THE POLICE SPECIAL BRANCH CAMPAIGN IN MILITARY  
REGION 3 TO ROLL UP KNOWN VIET CONG INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI) CADRES  
RESULTED IN ABOUT 1,500 ARRESTS IN THE PERIOD 8 APRIL - 7 JULY

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1972. OF THIS NUMBER ONLY 338 HAVE BEEN CONVICTED AND SENTENCED. THAT THE CAMPAIGN HAS HAD SOME IMPACT IS INDICATED BY THE ORDER OF VIET CONG PARTY COMMITTEES IN THREE PROVINCES TO THEIR CADRES TO PREPARE REPORTS OF THOSE ARRESTED AND TO MOVE LEGAL CADRES TO AREAS WHERE THEY ARE LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO ARREST BY VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES. MOST OF THOSE ARRESTED HAVE BEEN OF A LOW LEVEL IN THE VCI. THE ROLL-UP CAMPAIGN GOT OFF TO A SLOW START BECAUSE OF VARIOUS DIFFICULTIES IN IMPLEMENTATION, BUT SINCE THE PROMULGATION OF MARTIAL LAW MR-3 PROVINCE

HIEFS HAVE

GIVEN PROGRESSIVELY GREATER SUPPORT TO IT. END SUMMARY.

1. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE VIET CONG/NORTH VIETNAMESE ARMY (VC/NVA) MILITARY OFFENSIVE IN EARLY APRIL 1972, THE SPECIAL BRANCH OF THE NATIONAL POLICE (PSB) IN MILITARY REGION (MR) 3 HAS BEEN CARRYING OUT A SPECIAL CAMPAIGN TO ROLL UP KNOWN MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL VC INFRASTRUCTURE (VCI). THE PURPOSE OF THE CAMPAIGN IS TO WEAKEN LOCAL SUPPORT FOR VC/NVA MILITARY UNITS AND TO DISRUPT THE FUNCTIONING OF VC POLITICAL UNITS. GVN JUDICIAL REQUIREMENTS WERE MODIFIED TO PERMIT ARREST AND CONVICTION OF VCI SUSPECTS ON THE BASIS OF A SINGLE PIECE OF

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EVIDENCE RATHER THAN THE THREE REQUIRED UNDER NORMAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

2. FROM 8 APRIL TO 7 JULY THE PSB SPECIAL CAMPAIGN IN MR-3 PRODUCED THE FOLLOWING RESULTS: A TOTAL OF 1,502 VCI SUSPECTS WERE ARRESTED. OF THESE, 562 WERE RELEASED AFTER DETENTION, INTERROGATION, AND HEARINGS BEFORE PROVINCIAL SECURITY COUNCILS (PSC); 338 WERE CONVICTED AND RECEIVED PRISON SENTENCES, OF WHOM ONLY 70 RECEIVED SENTENCES OF ONE YEAR OR MORE WHILE THE OTHERS RECEIVED SENTENCES OF THREE MONTHS OR LESS; 202 WERE CONVICTED BY THE PSC BUT HAVE NOT YET BEEN SENTENCED; 373 DETAINEES ARE STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION AND THEIR CASES HAVE NOT YET BEEN PRESENTED BEFORE THE PSC; AND 27 HAVE BEEN TURNED OVER TO MILITARY COURTS FOR PROCESSING. OF THE TOTAL, SOME 1,200 WERE ARRESTED BY THE POLICE AND 300 CAPTURED OR ARRESTED BY OTHER SERVICES AND TURNED OVER FOR PROCESSING.

3. A BREAKDOWN OF THE MR-3 ROLL-UP BY PROVINCES SHOWS: BIEN HOA, 83; BINH DUONG, 171; BINH LONG, 0 [ ] COMMENT: THERE WAS A COMPLETE COLLAPSE OF POLICE ACTIVITIES IN BINH LONG PROVINCE AS A RESULT OF THE VC/NVA INVASION, AND POLICE RECORDS AT AN LOC, THE PROVINCE CAPITAL, WERE LOST OR DESTROYED); BINH TUY, 19; HAU NGHIA, 173; LONG AN, 179; LONG KHANH, 205; PHUOC

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LONG, 41; PHUOC TUY, 143; TAY NINH, 336; VUNG TAU CITY, 10; AND 142 ARRESTEES FROM VARIOUS PROVINCES TURNED OVER TO MR-3 PSB HEADQUARTERS DIRECTLY. THE DIFFERENCES IN FIGURES AMONG THE PROVINCES REFLECT POPULATION DENSITY, VCI STRENGTH IN EACH PROVINCE, AND THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE. 25X1

COMMENT: OTHER REPORTING AND INTERROGATIONS OF ARRESTEES INDICATE THAT THE MR-3 PSB SPECIAL CAMPAIGN HAS HAD SOME IMPACT ON VCI AND VCI EFFECTIVENESS IN SUPPORTING THE MILITARY OFFENSIVE. IN AT LEAST THREE MR-3 PROVINCES VC PARTY COMMITTEES HAVE BEEN ORDERED TO PREPARE DETAILED LISTINGS OF CADRES AND AGENTS ARRESTED SINCE THE OFFENSIVE BEGAN, AND ONE SUBREGION HAS ORDERED ITS LEGAL CADRES TO MOVE TO VC-CONTROLLED OR CONTESTED AREAS FROM HEAVILY POPULATED AND SUBURBAN AREAS WHERE THEY ARE MORE LIKELY TO BE ARRESTED BY THE GVN. HOWEVER, THE LEGAL CADRES WERE TOLD TO CONTINUE THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THOSE AREAS DESPITE THE THREAT OF ARREST.)

4. THE PSB CAMPAIGN IN MR-3 BEGAN SLOWLY. DIRECTIVES FROM THE SAIGON HEADQUARTERS WERE CONSIDERED BY PSB REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS TO GIVE INSUFFICIENT GUIDANCE ON REDUCED REQUIREMENTS FOR EVIDENCE. FURTHER, THEY DID NOT PROVIDE THE PSB

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WITH ENOUGH AUTHORITY TO CARRY OUT THE MISSION. [REDACTED]

COMMENT: MR-3 REGIONAL HEADQUARTERS ROUTINELY PASSED ON THE NEW DIRECTIVES TO THE PROVINCES BUT TOOK NO INITIATIVE IN ELABORATING ON THEM OR IN SEEKING STRONGER AUTHORITY FROM SAIGON. THERE WAS A CLEAR RELUCTANCE ON THE PART OF BOTH NATIONAL AND PSB CHIEFS TO ACT ON THE NEW POLICY WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF HIGHER AUTHORITIES.) LISTS WERE PREPARED BY PROVINCE PSB CHIEFS OF IDENTIFIED VCI TARGETS AND WERE SUBMITTED TO REGION FOR REVIEW AND APPROVAL. IN TURN, REGION PSB SOUGHT APPROVAL OF THE LISTS FROM SAIGON. AS A RESULT, THESE LISTS RECEIVED BROAD CIRCULATION, WITH THE CONSEQUENT RISK OF ALERTING THE TARGETS. THE LISTS WERE BROKEN INTO CATEGORIES OF VCI WITH "A" THE MOST DANGEROUS, "B" THE NEXT MOST DANGEROUS, AND "C" THE LEAST DANGEROUS. INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO ROLL-UP CATEGORIES "A" AND "B" FIRST AND LEAVE THE ARREST OF "C" TYPES UNTIL A LATER DATE. IN FACT, VERY FEW CATEGORY "A" AND "B" VCI HAVE BEEN ARRESTED; MORE THAN 90 PERCENT HAVE BEEN CATEGORY "C" LOW-LEVEL VILLAGE AND HAMLET CADRES, FOOD SUPPLIERS, COMMUNICATIONS-LIAISON WOMEN, RELATIVES OF KNOWN VCI, AND THOSE WHO SIMPLY PAID TAXES TO THE VC.

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5. DURING THE EARLY MONTHS OF THE CAMPAIGN, LOCAL OFFICIALS FREQUENTLY OBSTRUCTED THE PSB EFFORT IN A VARIETY OF WAYS, AND SUCH OPPOSITION ADVERSELY AFFECTED THE MORALE OF THE PSB.

[REDACTED] FOR AN EXAMPLE OF THESE OBSTRUCTIONS AND POLICE REACTION IN BIEN HOA PROVINCE.) AS THE NUMBER OF ARRESTEES INCREASED, POLICE DETENTION FACILITIES AND INTERROGATION FACILITIES WERE STRAINED BEYOND CAPACITY. PSB OFFICERS FOUND IT DIFFICULT TO PREPARE DOSSIERS ON THE ARRESTEES DETAILED ENOUGH TO SATISFY THE JUDICIAL AUTHORITIES AND THE PSC. THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF ACQUITTALS AND OF VERY SHORT SENTENCES SERVED TO HIGHLIGHT PSB INADEQUACIES. HOWEVER, SINCE THE PROMULGATION OF MARTIAL LAW, MR-3 PROVINCE CHIEFS HAVE PROGRESSIVELY GIVEN MORE SUPPORT TO THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN AND ARE DIRECTING THEIR PSC TO REDUCE EVIDENCE REQUIREMENTS TO OBTAIN MORE CONVICTIONS, AND TO HAND DOWN LONGER SENTENCES.

6. [REDACTED] DISSEM: EMBASSY MACV PSD [REDACTED] AT SAIGON; SENT TO CINCPAC, ARPAC, PACAF, PACFLT, PARIS. REPORT CLASS SECRET [REDACTED] CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. EXEMPT FROM DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E.O. 11652 EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B(1), (2). AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON APPROVAL OF DIRECTOR.

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